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Abstract: The Global Value Chain (GVC) approach has emerged as a novel methodological device
for analysing economic globalization and international trade. The suitability of the chain metaphor
and strategies for moving up the ladder of GVCs (“upgrade”) is widely echoed in international
development agencies and public agencies in the Global South. Most of the existing GVC studies
focus on new forms of firm-to-firm relationships and the role of lead firms and chain governance in
defining upgrading opportunities. This paper examines the role of the state and local institutional
initiatives in promoting upgrading in agricultural GVCs originating in rural areas of the Global
South. The paper draws on research conducted in the South Indian smallholder tea sector. The paper
argues that successful forms of state-led chain interventions not only contribute to upgrading of
the smallholder-brought leaf factory strand of the GVC originating in the South Indian tea sector,
but might also result in increasing bifurcation of smallholders integrated into high-margin markets
through prominent bought leaf factories and a mass of “others” outside this tightly coordinated
strand of the tea value chain.
Keywords: global value chains; state-led interventions; upgrading; bifurcation; inclusive
development strategies; smallholder tea; horizontal and vertical coordination; South India
1. Introduction
Since the early 2000s, the Global Value Chain (GVC) approach has proliferated as a novel
methodological device for analysing economic globalization and international trade [1–4]. GVC
studies focus on the emergence of new global production systems in which economic integration
goes beyond international trade in raw materials and final products to include the internationally
dispersed but centrally coordinated production of given commodities or manufactured products
by “chains” of independent economic actors [5]. The appearance of these systems is related to the
international extension and externalisation of manufacturing activities previously internalised “within
the organisational boundaries of vertically integrated corporations” [6] (p. 7). As Gereffi emphasizes,
we see “large firms in globalized production systems simultaneously participate in many different
countries, not in an isolated or segmented fashion but as part of their global production and distribution
strategies” [5] (p. 96). Therefore, the geographical spread of transnational production arrangements,
their organisational scope, or, in other words, linkages between various economic agents—raw-material
suppliers, factories, trader and retailers—become pertinent in order to understand their overall
dynamics as well as their sources of stability and change [7].
Most of the existing GVC studies focus on new forms of firm-to-firm relationships and the role of
lead firms—conceptualised as companies holding a position in the chain that allows them to determine
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the operational and functional scope of other chain participants—and chain governance in defining
upgrading opportunities [8,9]. A key argument underlying these studies is that mechanisms and
circumstances for upgrading possibilities and patterns for inclusion and exclusion should mainly be
sought within the value chain [2] (pp. 28–29). Public regulation and the wide institutional framework
as a conditional factor for GVC governance and upgrading are rarely studied, though a notable
recent study on the nature and scope of institutional support for upgrading processes is provided by
Neilson and Pritchard (2009) [10]. The authors comprehend governance arrangements and institutional
formations as being co-produced by internal, place-bound actors and external “lead firm” actors [11]
(p. 43) and stress that “prospects for upgrading hinge on how the multi-scalar industrial formations
into which economic actors are embedded interact with new governance arrangements frequently set
in train by agents remote from their immediate environment” [10] (p. 211).
The chain metaphor and strategies for gaining access to and upgrade within GVC have been
echoed and adopted by almost all major multilateral donor agencies during the last decade (for a
comprehensive review of strategy papers published by international development agencies with a
value chain focus, see [1,2,12]). Value chain intervention strategies have also proliferated amongst
state agencies as part of a new (post-Washington Consensus) generation of policies addressing the role
of the state in mediating development strategies [12]. Although, for obvious reasons, there are huge
variations and differences in the adaptation of value chain inspired development projects implemented
by agencies ranging from non-governmental organisations, to multilateral donor organisations and
agencies (see also [2,12]), the adaptation of upgrading is based on an implicit perception that it mainly
results from internal chain-specific dynamics (firm-to-firm relationships). Once entry is gained by
producers in developing countries, learning effects take place within GVCs arising from firm-to-firm
relationships. The prevailing narrative stresses competition and the free market as desirable for the
welfare of producers in the Global South, and lead firms or groups of actors downstream in the chain
are mitigating information asymmetry through the dynamics of inter-firm/farm coordination, while
the state appears as a “market-facilitating” institution [1] (p. 1240).
The research questions which drive this paper is the role of the state and local institutional
initiatives in promoting upgrading in agricultural GVCs originating in rural areas of the Global South,
and the limitations to state-led upgrading of agricultural GVCs in the contemporary global economy.
In order to answer these questions, the paper draws on fieldwork conducted in the GVC for tea
originating in the smallholder-bought leaf factory strand of the tea chain in South India. In the case of
the GVC for tea, leading branded tea manufacturers have conquered a substantial share of trade in
tea, and proprietary brands dominate most consumer markets in the Global North [10]. Just seven
companies are estimated to account for 90 per cent of tea traded into European and North American
consumer markets, while four leading branded manufacturers—Unilever, Van Rees, James Finlay and
Tata Tetley—are estimated to dominate tea trade [13]. Branded tea manufacturers have strategically
diversified from direct tea cultivation and outsourced (part of) their production and processing
capacity as part of their focus on core competences downstream in the chain, notably branding,
packaging and marketing. This restructuring of their supply chains provided “room for manoeuvre”
for smallholder production and prospects for upgrading as the branded tea manufacturers increasingly
source deliveries directly from producers (smallholders, tea estates and blending companies). Besides
the operational shifts in the activities of the leading tea manufacturers, they seek to stimulate demand
and/or defend their market position through brand development, product innovation and market
segmentation. Smallholder tea production is typically targeted by branded tea manufacturers as a
means to secure the reputation of their brands and demonstrate that certain basic principles concerning
ethical and environmental impacts of production and processing are addressed in their supply chain.
For example, the world’s largest buyer of black tea—Unilever—only purchases Rainforest Alliance
certified tea for its two major brands, Lipton and PG Tips. Apart from certification of its own
plantations, Unilever increasingly sources tea from smallholders and engages in programmes on
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smallholder compliance with Rainforest Alliance certification, for example in Kenya (for more details
see [14–16]).
Branded tea manufacturers such as Unilever and Tata Tetley are present in the South Indian tea
landscape and coexist with the smallholder–bought leaf factory strand of the chain. The tea estate and
smallholder–bought leaf factory sub-sectors have followed a largely independent path during the last
decades and no significant relationships have emerged between the two sub-sectors of the South Indian
tea industry. Following a collapse in tea prices in the late 1990s, which had serious repercussions for
smallholders and bought leaf factories (hereafter BLFs) in South India, the Tea Board of India launched
a comprehensive “Quality Upgrading” programme early in the new millennium. This paper argues
that value chain interventions by the state (through the Tea Board of India) has been pivotal in product
and process upgrading in the smallholder–BLF strand of the value chain, which additionally has
facilitated functional upgrading by some BLF. Vertical linkages and improved manufacturing practices
have a positive effect on BLF performance, which is rewarded at auction centres and increasing also
through direct linkages to blending companies, and transmitted to the smallholder level in form of
higher prices attached to higher quality tea leaves. Higher quality standards and vertical coordination,
however, seem to result in increasing bifurcation where some smallholder growers are integrated
into high-margin markets through successful upgrading strategies by prominent BLFs and a mass of
“others” locked into thinner and volatile markets.
The article is accordingly organised into seven sections. Following the Introduction, the Section 2
engages with the current conceptual debates on upgrading in global agricultural value chains. The
paper maintains that a tangible way to analyse the elusive question of how producers, regions and/or
countries scale the value-added ladder, or in other words upgrade in the era of globalization is to adopt
a value chain specific approach. The concept of upgrading provided by the seminal work of Humphrey
and Schmitz (2002) and recent studies on the nature and scope of institutional support for upgrading is
elaborated [8,10]. Section 3 outlines the entry point and methods used in researching the GVC for tea
and in particular the “touchdown” and the ramification in the main tea growing area in South India.
Sections 4–6 move on to the South Indian context and present and discuss the results. Firstly, a brief
outline of the historical development of the tea sector is provided, followed by recent state-governed
efforts to upgrade smallholders and BLFs in the South Indian tea sector (Section 4). Section 5 analyses
upgrading trajectories at the BLF level. The BLFs manufacture so-called made tea based on either CTC
(cut, tea and curl) or orthodox processing methods, where leaves are rolled against a cutting table.
The analysis of upgrading takes point of departure in product differentiation at the BLF level as an
indicator of upgrading and attempts to discern patterns of differences in the BLFs’ strategies related
to process, product, and functional upgrading. The analysis shows an merging bifurcation between
a group of BLFs that have improved manufacturing practices and started operating in line with the
tightly coordinated smallholder–BLF model initiated by the Tea Board of India, and a group of BLFs
with a loosely coordinated value chain and main emphasize on increasing volume of one (substandard)
“tea quality”. Section 6 discusses the limits of state-led upgrading interventions targeting all BLFs in
the region, while Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Conceptualising Upgrading in Global Agricultural Value Chains
A GVC is conceptualised as a series of strands or “filaments” (i.e., firm- or country-specific
sub-chains) linking producers and enterprises in, for example, developing countries to those in
developed ones and a value chain can be seen as “a set of inter-organisational networks clustered
around one commodity or product, in which networks are situationally specific, socially constructed
and locally integrated” [6] (p. 2). A GVC is constituted by four elements: (1) the input–output
structure: a set of products and services linked together in a sequence of value-adding economic
activities; (2) the geographical coverage of value chains: the spatial dispersion or concentration of
production and distribution networks, comprised of enterprises of different sixes and types; (3) chain
governance structures; and (4) public and private institutions at different spatial scales which shape
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the actors and their relationships in the GVC (see Neilson and Pritchard [10] for a solid discussion
of the interrelationship between governance and the institutional framework. Apart from the more
descriptive aspects of the analytical dimensions—the input–output structure and territoriality—the
twin concepts of “governance” and “upgrading” in the GVC approach have received the most attention
so far, since this is where the key notions of entry barriers, chain coordination and upgrading
possibilities are introduced. The term governance draws attention to the vertical coordination of
economic activities through non-market relationships (i.e., inter-firm linkages). Conceptualising
governance as “authority and power relations that determine how financial, material and human
resources are allocated and flow within a chain” [5] (p. 97) hinges not only on the power of lead firms
but also on how coordination in GVCs is exercised through the enforcement of for example higher
standards of quality and reliability in produce flow, resulting in reduced risk and investment costs.
The concept of upgrading draws attention to the mechanisms by which farms and firms are able to
move from low-value to relatively high-value activities through participation in GVCs. Here, the GVC
literature discusses how subordinate participation in a GVC may provide indirect access for small
producers to markets, technologies and knowledge at lower costs than they would otherwise face.
On this basis, GVCs are seen as constituting the organisational basis of participating in international
trade and the starting point for attempts by farms and firms in, for example, developing countries to
improve their position within it (by making better products more efficiently and with more skilled
workers), or in other words to upgrade [17]. The latter is perceived as the process by which producers,
regions and/or countries scale the value-added ladder, either by moving to more rewarding functional
positions within GVCs, or by making more value-added products.
In the seminal work of Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) [8], upgrading is further deconstructed as:
• process upgrading (inputs are transformed more efficiently by organisational or technical
improvements);
• product upgrading (production is moved into more sophisticated product lines, measured by e.g.,
increased unit values);
• functional upgrading (new functions are acquired, leading to the increased skill content of
activities); and
• inter-sectoral upgrading (new productive activities are entered into by clusters of firms).
Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) emphasized that distinct types of upgrading in a particular GVC
are dependent on the nature of the relationships that exist between the main actors involved in a
transaction, and “different forms of chain governance have different upgrading implications” [8]
(p. 1023). The incentives for lead firms to facilitate upgrading of suppliers beyond process and
product upgrading (e.g., functional upgrading) require that the lead firms governing the chain “are
willing to relinquish” lower value-added functions up- and/or downstream of the chain [8] (p. 1024),
which—due to the companies’ competitive strategies—is often not the case. Further, as pointed out
by Gereffi (2014) [2] and Werner et al. (2014) [1], lead firms might reproduce entry barriers in order
to defend their position in the chain, and the extent to which state and development agencies can
facilitate programmes to engage smallholder or firm upgrading seems to be more successful if lead
firms are facing supply shortages [2] or perceive it as a means to access “large, emerging markets in
supplier countries” [1] (p. 1241).
In the recent literature on global agricultural value chains, upgrading has mainly, but not
exclusively (see e.g., [18,19]), been analysed through the lens of Humphrey and Schmitz (2002),
i.e., product, process, functional upgrading and inter-sectoral upgrading, though the categories
have been criticised on several points [20] (For example Ponte and Ewert (2009) [20] analyse
upgrading trajectories in the South African wine industry through the categories put forward by
Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) [8]. These categories, however, are criticised on several points, notably
with regard to the problems of placing various real processes unambiguously in one or the other
category (e.g., should complying with food safety standards be classified as product or process
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upgrading?). Ponte and Ewert (2009) suggest a more detailed understanding of upgrading possibilities
in agro-food GVCs, including processes usually considered to be downgrading in the GVC literature,
e.g., selling lower value products on a larger scale [20].) Several agri-food GVC studies discuss how
lead firms facilitate or restrict the prospects for upgrading farms and companies in the Global South
(e.g., [9,21–24]). Upgrading potential and limitations for smallholders and agri-food processors as a
result of more demanding food safety and quality standards imposed by northern retailers have been
studied extensively in Kenya (see amongst others [9,25–27]). Product and process parameters (e.g.,
GlobalGAP) imposed by northern retailers force exporters and producers in southern countries to
acquire a range of new capabilities to retain their relationships. On the one hand, higher performance
levels and/or requirements for more functional capacity mean that suppliers need to obtain economies
of scale and acquire greater financial resources to carry overheads for additional service provision. This
increases entry barriers to smaller and more poorly resourced companies and smallholder cooperatives.
Smallholder involvement in the export sector has declined significantly following European retailers’
requirement that exports meet the GlobalGAP standards, and production for the retailers’ supply chain
of fresh fruit and vegetables is now mainly carried out by large contract farms linked to large-scale
export companies, while the few smallholders that remain engaged in this supply chain are linked to
growers/exporters in various forms of outgrower schemes [26,27].
A key argument underlying these studies is that opportunities for upgrading and entry barriers
for smallholders and processors in high-margin markets are increasingly influenced by the strategic
needs of a handful of leading retailers or branded manufacturers in the north. Lee et al. (2010) [3]
(p. 6) focus on the importance of lead firms’ strategies and upgrading opportunities in agri-food
GVCs and suggest the prevalence of four distinct agri-food GVC structures, based on the degree
of concentration in food production (farmers and manufacturers) and in food retail (supermarkets
and other food retailers): buyer-driven retail chains, producer-driven chains, bilateral oligopolies,
and traditional markets. According to the authors “each type of value chain structure is associated
with a distinctive constellation of food safety and quality standards reflecting the attributes of its lead
firms” and smallholder involvement and upgrading potential therefore critically depend on the type
of GVC in which they are engaged. In buyer-driven retail chains, such as the GVC for fresh food and
vegetables, significant upgrading opportunities for smallholders exist, despite retailers’ concern with
product safety and quality along the GVC. Typically, these chains are relatively short and exporters
in developing countries have incentives to support smallholder production. In contrast, smallholder
opportunities for upgrading are likely to be limited in bilateral oligopolies, such as fruit products
(bananas and pineapples), and producer-driven chains (coffee and cocoa). In bilateral oligopolies,
smallholder involvement and upgrading opportunities relate to participation in contract farming
schemes with rather high entry barriers. In producer-driven chains, lead firms (branded manufacturers)
are more concerned with quality-based competition and product differentiation than food safety,
and relatively to the buyer-driven retail chain, smallholders’ upgrading potentials are limited in
producer-driven chains because of the presence of large processors in the chain (cocoa grinders and
coffee roasters). Traditional markets found in many smallholder-based agro-food chains (such as fresh
produce) have lower entry barriers, but upgrading possibilities are limited partly due to a lack of
adequate (public and private) support for upgrading [3]. The role of public and private supporting
institutions such as extension and training centres, research institutions, and farmer organisations for
promoting upgrading are touch upon in relation to traditional markets, but mechanisms for upgrading
and barriers should mainly be sought within the chain and upgrading trajectories for smallholders,
and local companies are intermediated through their ties with global lead firms [12] (p. 2).
To a large extent, the adaptation of upgrading and value chain inspired development projects
implemented by multilateral donor organisations and state agencies is based on this implicit perception:
upgrading mainly results from internal chain-specific dynamics and a distinct “life history” of stages
or that it can take forms that can be defined in the abstract for value chains in general. Once entry is
gained by producers in developing countries, learning effects take place within GVCs arising from
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lead firm–supplier interactions (see also [2,12]). While value chain linkages embody the capacity
for supply chain management and upgrading, the crucial role of institutional support is stressed
by Neilson and Pritchard (2009) in their take on upgrading [10]. The authors examine upgrading
in the coffee and tea industry in South India, also taking point of departure in the seminal work of
Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) [8]. The market dominance of branded tea and coffee manufacturers
provides them with great leverage to reshape the functional division of labour along the GVCs for tea,
and their purchasing practices strongly influence both price movements and the demand for certain
qualities of the products in producing countries—and increasingly also the prospects for smallholder
upgrading through the incorporation of producers in this strand of the GVC. These restructuring
processes, however, do not occur within a “passive political landscape” as the institutional environment
in the tea and coffee sectors in South India shape producers’ capacity to participate in GVCs and
the economic benefits they obtain from such participation. As stressed by Neilson et al. (2006) [28]
(pp. 331–332), the South Indian tea sector “illustrates the crucial role of institutions as arenas for
quality upgrading and strategic response formation” and further, “the diligent response by UPASI,
KVK and the Tea Board underline how institutions can develop and deploy new strategies for otherwise
imperilled smallholders”. The same focus on the importance of the role of institutions in upgrading
processes is found in Selwyn’s (2008) study on the export dependent horticultural value chain in
Brazil [19]. Selwyn (2008) emphasize that public institutions such as marketing boards, research and
technical service centres, and producer organisations might be the key drivers for upgrading processes
as “They can assist potential supplier first to (a) gain access to global markets and (b) maintain their
position in them” [19] (p. 391).
The following analysis of upgrading processes in the smallholder–BLF strand of tea chain in South
India applies the concept of upgrading provided by Humphrey and Schmitz [8]. The analysis moves
beyond the frontier of the “lead firm” in the global tea value chain (i.e., branded tea manufacturers)
and explores the role of the state in supporting product, process, and functional upgrading at the
BLFs level. Hence, the paper contributes to the writings discussed above by investigating the role of
public policy and institutional support on value chain upgrading strategies, but it aims to take the
discussion regarding upgrading processes further by suggesting that successful forms of state-led
chain interventions not only contribute to upgrading of the strand of the GVC originating in the Global
South, but might also result in increasing bifurcation of smallholders integrated into high-margin
markets through prominent BLFs and a mass of “others” outside this tightly coordinated strand of the
tea value chain.
3. Materials and Methods
To explore upgrading processes in the export dependent strand of the GVC for tea in South
India, and the role of the state in supporting upgrading, semi-structured interviews were conducted
with three main groups of actors in the value chain: Blending companies, BLFs, and tea growers
(smallholders and tea estates). The interview guides were structured around a predefined range
of issues and aimed at operationalising these in relation to the behaviour of specific groups of
subjects. Each interview guide focused on: (1) specific questions related to the actors’ (different)
role in the tea chain; (2) the horizontal and vertical relationships between actors in the chain;
and (3) common themes, notwithstanding actors’ different positions in the chain. The interview
guide for owners/managers of BLFs included: (1) background to entering the sector and basic data
about the BLF; (2) sourcing strategies, competition and pricing, including organisation of buying
networks, buying strategies and coverage, forms of quality control and scope of the relationship to
smallholders; (3) relationship between the BLF and other BLFs (whether they collaborate or coordinate
certain issues), how and why (not); and (4) relationship between the BLF and state agencies and other
institutions including supervision and training by the agricultural extension agency. The interview
guide for owners/managers of blending companies included: (1) background to entering the sector
and basic data about the blending company; (2) export destinations, quality requirements their tea
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product exports must meet; (3) relations between blending companies and importers (e.g., types of
contract) as well as the scope of the relationship; and (4) sourcing strategies including relationships
between blending companies and leaf manufacturers (BLFs or estates) and/or sourcing strategies at
the auctions. The interview guide for tea growers (smallholders and estates) included: (1) background
to entering the sector and basic data about the estate/farm household; (2) husbandry and harvest
(plucking) practices including range and extent of extension services, grading and quality control
procedures; and (3) relationship between tea grower and buyers (e.g., BLF; buying post operators;
blenders or importers in the case of tea estates).
In order to obtain a thorough understanding of the type(s) and range of relationships prevailing
in the various parts of the chain, similar sets of questions were developed for both “sides” of the
relationship, for example between BLFs and tea growers. In addition, in order to compare and contrast
different sources of findings addressing the same phenomenon or common themes (for example,
issues of quality), all actors were asked similar questions on the subjects. The interviews contained
a mixture of open and closed, as well as quantitative and qualitative questions. Using both open
and closed questions implied responses that were both straight answers to direct questions and
responses characterised by elaborations and opinions. Open questions were particularly suitable for
understanding relational aspects between different actors in the chain, both horizontally and vertically,
and the underlying processes influencing upgrading trajectories, while closed questions created a base
for constructing comparative patterns from individual cases within the different nodes, for example,
the number of smallholders supplying tea leaves to BLFs, BLFs processing capacity and possession of
land for tea cultivation.
The research covered interviews with private blending companies. Twenty private blending
companies were identified and efforts were made to interview them all, but only 13 were interviewed,
on the basis of their availability. These companies export tea from South India to markets in Europe,
the US, West Asia, the Middle East, Africa and the Commonwealth of Independent States (hereafter
CIS). In addition, interviews were held with seven large corporate tea estates exporting mainly to
countries in Europe. Interviews were conducted with 22 BLFs. Since the BLFs are dispersed over a huge
geographical area in the Nilgiris, specific geographical areas had to be selected. The initial selection of
taluks (the administrative unit below district level) and villages was based on degree of competition
between BLFs, where the number of BLFs was used as a proxy for higher(er) or low(er) levels of
buying competition. This selection criterion is based on the assumption that high or low competition
might act as proxies for the greater or lesser involvement of BLFs in smallholder tea production.
In addition, the selection of BLFs (and smallholders) in geographical areas was designed to cover a
cross-sample of agro-ecological conditions. Within the areas identified, BLFs were selected according to
size of factory (production capacity, market share, and sales level). A survey of 110 smallholders were
conducted based on their marketing channel and stratified by size of landholding. It was assumed
that ownership-related assets (e.g., possession of land, and labour) influence smallholders’ ability
to comply with more demanding quality requirements, as well as their ability to become engaged
in direct sale arrangements with the BLF. Smallholders were selected according to their marketing
channel, that is, farmers selling their produce directly to the BLF (or via so-called self-help groups) or to
buying agents. Finally, the role of public and private sector initiatives in promoting and upgrading the
smallholder–BLF strand of the value chain was elucidated by addressing these topics to respondents
in the different segments of the chain (i.e., exporters, blenders, BLFs, smallholders). In addition,
interviews were held with brokers and professional tea-testers at the three auction centres in South
India—Coonoor, Coimbatore (Tamil Nadu) and Cochin (Kerala)—and in Kolkata (West Bengal) and
with various industry representatives including government staff at the Tea Board in Coonoor and
Kolkata, the Tea Research Institute, the National Tea Research Foundation, the Indian Tea Association
and associations representing tea estates, BLFs and smallholders.
The analysis and interpretation of these data entailed a detailed examination of patterns and
explanatory factors, first at each node of the chain, and secondly through an examination of the nature
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and range of the relationships between actors at different nodes in the chain. The remainder of this
paper builds on the fieldwork outlined here, though the main focus is on the results from the analysis
of upgrading at the BLF level and blending companies’ (changing) sourcing strategies. The analysis
of upgrading takes point of departure in product differentiation at the BLF level as an indicator of
upgrading and attempts to discern patterns of differences in the BLFs’ upgrading strategies. Three
dimensions of process upgrading are examined: improvements in the manufacturing process and
management of quality, management of supply chain (procurement system), and marketing strategies.
Likewise, three dimensions of product upgrading are examined: product consistency, average unit
price at auction, price split between fin, and standard quality tea at auction. Finally, recent value-added
activities (functional upgrading) are examined.
4. The “Quality Turn-Around” in the South India Smallholder Tea Sector
4.1. Development of the Smallholder–Bought Leaf Factory Strand
In South India, tea estates date back to the end of the 1800s, where the expansion of
plantation-based cultivation of tea was supported by the political and institutional framework of
British colonialism [15]. During the 1970s, the government through various support programmes
encouraged smallholders to convert from vegetable production for domestic markets to tea cultivation
especially for export and round 60,000 smallholder tea growers coexist with large (branded) corporate
and medium proprietary tea estates in the Nilgiris (Tamil Nadu). Currently, the privately owned
plantation sector comprises both large branded tea manufacturers (e.g., Hindustan Unilever and Tata
Tea) with a focus on core competences downstream of the chain—notably branding, packaging and
marketing—and smaller, independent (non-branded) tea plantations. Tea exported in packed or bulk
form from this sub-sector has historically been excluded from compulsory sale through the auction
system in South India [29]. Tea is traded “under the garden name” and mainly directly to the buyers’
blending and packing factories in consuming countries, where individual tea grades and qualities
are made into consumer blends and packed for domestic sales or re-exported to other countries, for
instance, within the European Union. Typically, this strand of the GVC is tightly coordinated in order
to comply with specific quality and food safety requirements: the seven tea estates interviewed have
only one or a few main buyers (e.g., branded tea manufacturers such as Unilever and Twinings and/or
retailers (e.g., Wal-Mart)), relationships tend to be long term, and a majority of the tea grades are sold
on forward contracts.
The smallholder–BLF strand originating in South India has been integrated into global tea markets
through a loosely coordinated value chain, and the relationships between different agents in the chain
tend to be of the “arm’s length” kind, while the coordinating mechanism of the chain is based on
market principles. The boom period of smallholder–BLF tea production and trade was driven by the
demand for low- to medium-quality tea in export markets, notably countries of the former Soviet Union.
In the late 1970s, the government of India established bilateral trading agreements with countries of
the former Soviet Union. Buoyant global market conditions and a slow phasing out of the bilateral
trading agreements after the collapse of the former Soviet Union led to a boom in the South India
tea sector in the 1990s, and exports of tea from the Nilgiris continued to increase until the end of the
1990s. From the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, around 80 per cent of Nilgiri tea production was exported
to the former Soviet Union/CIS [30]. At the turn of the century, approximately 65,000 smallholders
contributed more than 40 per cent of South India’s tea production, with around 75 per cent of the
production taking place in the Nilgiris of Tamil Nadu [31,32]. Access to low-interest government loans
led to the rapid growth of BLFs, which buy and process green leaves from smallholders. In early 2000s,
156 BLFs were officially engaged in the primary purchasing and processing of tea in the region [13,33].
However, by the end of the last decade, around 40 of the 156 BLFs had ceased operating. (As a result
of either bankruptcy following the crisis or as a result of closure by the Tea Board of India for failing to
Sustainability 2016, 8, 1102 9 of 19
comply with the minimum health, hygiene and quality requirements stipulated in the Prevention of
Food Adulteration Act.)
Trade relations with markets in the CIS countries supported the development of a more or less
monopolistic export structure in South India, where Indian tea exporters and producers received
relatively high returns for the sale of low-quality bulk tea, when expressed in local currency terms [28]
(p. 328). Meanwhile, there was a steady increase in the number of established factories (tea estates
and BLFs) converting from orthodox to CTC manufacturing (cut, tear and curl) as a result of the
increasing demand for CTC-manufactured tea in export markets, and most of the new BLFs in South
India invested in CTC machines. In the orthodox manufacturing process, leaves are rolled against
a cutting table and this process retains the aroma of the leaf and (generally) produces high-quality
tea. In contrast, in CTC-manufactured tea, leaves are rolled between two rollers and this gives almost
twice as high a “cuppage” for the same quantity of tea and a strong liquor and the CTC manufacturing
process makes it easier to use lower- to medium-quality teas. (Selective plucking methods are required
for the production of orthodox tea (i.e., only two leaves and a bud), while more leaves can be used
in CTC tea production because of the cut, tear, curl process.). The major shift from orthodox to CTC
production took place between 1980 and 1990, when production of orthodox tea declined from 52 per
cent to 24.8 per cent of the total production during the period [34,35]. According to the Tea Board
of India and United Planters’ Association of Southern India-Krishi Vigyan Kendra (UPASI-KVK)
(2005), three decades earlier the smallholder–BLF sector was “known to follow cultural practices,
without compromising on quality due to the presence of orthodox tea manufacturing in the region . . .
However, due to the increasing demand for CTC teas by the erstwhile USSR and other European
countries and the favourable market condition for medium teas, quality took a downturn” [35] (p. 5).
Smallholders tended to maximise harvest output while BLFs and/or green-leaf buying agents carried
out undifferentiated buying of produce from smallholders, and BLFs generally produced low-quality
tea based on mature, coarse leaves with a high stalk content [36].
The auctions in South India have historically been the most important channels through which
made tea from the smallholder–BLF strand of the chain is distributed to blenders and/or wholesalers.
(Though vertically integrated blending companies sourced part of their supplies from their own tea
estates and purchased the remainder at the auctions (e.g., Tata Tetley obtained a large proportion of
the tea for blending from their own estates in North and South India before they deposed of most of
their tea gardens in India)). Apart from functioning as a public price discovery system, the auction
system makes available substantial quantities of a range of different grades and qualities (Auctions
are conducted on a weekly basis throughout the year in South India, and the auctions in the three
auction centres are held on different days of the week.), while brokers (auctioneers) provide an initial
assessment of the quality and grade of tea available for sale every week and suggest the expected price
rate for different grades and qualities based on market demand and export potential, combined with
their own views on the market conditions in India and in international markets. The export reliance of
the South Indian tea industry exposed smallholders and BLFs to the vagaries of the world markets.
At the end of the 1990s, for example, world tea prices were under pressure: during the three months
from February to May 1998, the average price at the Mombassa auction (Kenya) declined by almost
50 per cent, from USD 2.81 per kg to USD 1.56 per kg of made tea, with the other auctions experiencing
similar drops. However, average tea prices at the three South Indian auctions declined more markedly
and more persistently than average tea prices at the other main auctions in the world, suggesting a
severe price discount was attached the South Indian tea. In 2003, average tea prices at the South India
auctions had declined to well below the cost of production [36].
In response to the severe price crisis and in recognition of changing global market conditions,
the executive director of the parastatal Tea Board of India stressed that “the tea factories in the
country can no longer sustain domestic and global business without obtaining quality, consistency and
process certifications covered by the International Standard Organisation (ISO 9001: 2000), Hazard
Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) and the well-known ISI mark from the Bureau of Indian
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standards” [37]. This statement was backed up early in the new millennium, then the Tea Board of
India launched a comprehensive “Tea Quality Upgradation and Product Diversification Scheme”,
and initially allocated 403 crore Rs (USD 93.7 million) to subsidise the costs of upgrading production
and processing capacities in the tea sector and improve the competitive position of smallholders and
BLFs in the region along with the tea estate sub-sector.
4.2. Quality Upgrading Interventions Linking Smallholders to Bought Leaf Factories
The smallholder–BLF sub-sector in South India was specifically targeted via a sub-scheme,
“the Quality Upgradation Programme” (QUP), based on collaboration between the Tea Board of India
and a regionally based collaboration between the agricultural extension agency (KVK) and UPASI [35].
While the strategy papers do not explicitly refer to value chain interventions, the vocabulary is couched
in terms of “product and process upgrading”, “value-added activities”, “linkage creation between
BLFs and farmer groups” and provision of financial assistance to tea gardens (smallholders and
tea estates) and factories for renovating production and processing capabilities in order to improve
the quality of tea produced and hence “fetch remunerative returns for the tea sold” [33] (p. 1).
The programme was initially designed as a five-year initiative and has since been replaced by similar
five-year programmes [38]. The QUP targeting the smallholder–BLF strand narrowly concentrated
on product and process upgrading: through interventions around the first point of purchase and by
subsidising improvements (or new investments) in processing techniques at BLF level the Tea Board of
India attempted to circumvent the quality assurance procedures (initiating both product and process
upgrading) and encouraging product differentiation and hence potentially increasing the unit value
(product upgrading).
A regulatory framework for quality control at the interface between smallholders and BLFs was
consolidated. The policy interventions entailed the enforcement of a statutory minimum quality
standard and a strengthening of the regulatory and inspection systems at the primary processing and
blending levels. Three quality grading standards were identified (“fine”, “medium” and “coarse”),
based on a common set of leaf indicators for a consignment of tea (Fine standard is defined as two
leaves and a bud, medium standard is defined as three leaves and a bud, and coarse standard is
defined as more than three leaves and a bud [35]; see also [39] (pp. 64–65)). Tea leaves traded between
smallholders and BLFs should be graded according to these standards and premium prices paid for
fine-quality tea. Furthermore, the Tea Board of India imposed a minimum quality standard based on
the acceptable shoot composition of a consignment of tea: at least 65 per cent of a consignment of tea
traded should consist of fine leaves. These regulatory interventions were further strengthened during
the late 2000s through a new set of directives specifically related to the enforcement of the minimum
quality requirement—the shoot composition of a consignment of tea—attracting penalties in the case
of non-compliance.
Organisational and technical improvements at the BLF level (process upgrading) were encouraged
through a series of financial incentive structures. The Tea Board of India provided a subsidy
of 50 per cent of the total cost of investing in new and/or improved processing techniques (e.g.,
withering, rolling, drying, fermentation and power handling). On average, 54,000 Rs (USD 1255) have
been allocated to 85 BLFs, mainly for financing new and/or improving existing machinery [33].
In addition to financial incentives to upgrade factories, technical assistance and training of
well-performing BLFs were provided by UPASI-KVK staff through the QUP (see below). Endorsement
of the newly established minimum quality standard was implemented partly through these subsidies,
as this entailed signing an “affidavit”, confirming that the factories would manufacture tea using only
good quality leaves and adhere to the minimum quality standards, whether the material is purchased
from smallholders or from tea cultivated on the BLF’s own adjacent garden. If they failed to comply,
the factories would be obliged to return the subsidy, with interest, to the Tea Board of India.
A second component of the programme entailed the establishment of so-called Quality Tea
Procurement and Service Centres organised by women’s self-help groups (hereafter SHGs) as a means
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to shorten the value chain and link smallholders directly to the BLFs (Buying agents were accused
of “exploiting the growers in the village while procuring leaf from them on behalf of the factories”,
including cheating on weighing and grading and adding “additionals” to the leaves (water, sand,
etc.) before returning to the BLF gate [35] (p. 125)). Most of the women’s SHGs had functioned
under different NGOs (mostly focusing on empowering women and improving their livelihoods in
the villages and with no background in the tea sector) and UPASI-KVK (field and factory officers)
played a pivotal role in facilitating the establishment of direct sales arrangements between these newly
established quality leaf procurement and service centres and the more progressive BLFs. Seventy
quality leaf procurement and service centres were established and registered but, initially, only a few
BLFs showed any interest in purchasing from the centres, mainly because the centres were not able to
supply sufficient quantities of medium-standard/fine tea leaves. As a result, 20 centres were selected
as “model centres” and supplied with leaf procurement sheds, weights and (albeit on a limited scale)
fertilisers and pesticides as a means to encourage smallholders to form groups and supply green leaves
to these centres on a regular basis. The “SHG-centre model” was aimed at situating responsibility for
compliance with the acceptable shoot composition of a consignment of tea at the village/centre level
rather than at the factory level: the sorting of tea leaves of different qualities is performed by SHG
members at the centres, which in turn provide the BLFs with the possibility of imposing a differential
price system based on a price premium attached to fine-quality tea. Further, several “awareness and
training meetings” were held in nearly 200 smallholder tea-producing villages in the Nilgiris, with
the intention of improving smallholders’ plucking practices and increasing the proportion of fine leaf
plucked as well as implementing appropriate field maintenance practices. Around one-third of the 110
smallholders interviewed had received training by UPASI-KVK staff (either through in-field training
or a half-day meeting organised by UPASI-KVK), and the majority of the growers in the survey were
aware that the standard of plucking greatly influences the quality of the made tea.
The move towards value chain interventions for quality upgrading in the South Indian tea sector,
targeting both BLFs and smallholders in the region should be well acknowledged. For decades,
the industry as a whole encouraged smallholders and BLFs to increase volume rather than quality.
Today, however, most smallholders and BLFs are aware of the possible enhancement of product
quality through proper husbandry practices in the field and quality management procedures at the
factory level. Hence, the “quality upgrading” programme initiated by the Tea Board of India has
come a long way in accommodating the trend towards product differentiation and high-quality
requirements in mainstream and niche markets (specialty tea) and hence the opportunity to “tap”
into these higher-value end-market segments in both national and international markets. It is further
worth noting that state interventions and the concomitant upgrading costs to this magnitude run
contrary to what has happened in most other traditional cash-crop producing and exporting countries
following the implementation of structural adjustment programmes and the withdrawal of the state
from key market coordinating functions. According to the Tea Board of India’s own estimates, around
35 per cent of the operating BLFs in the region have introduced two or more processing lines, sorting
tea leaves of different quality through the production process and providing price-based incentives to
smallholders [35,38].
5. Emerging Bifurcation of the Smallholder–Bought Leaf Factory Strand of the Value Chain?
As accentuated above, the value chain interventions are premised on incentive structures
(financially and training-wise) and diffusion of quality management cum upgrading through the
vehicle of “role models”. In order to understand what facilitates and enables BLFs to successfully
upgrade and what might hinder upgrading, the following subsection explores a group of BLFs
that have improved manufacturing practices and started operating in line with the tightly linked
smallholder–BLF “model”, while another group of BLFs continuing to produce only one (substandard)
“tea quality”, without any sorting of the leaves before processing, will be considered in the following
subsection. In both groups of BLFs, process, product and functional upgrading are examined.
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5.1. Bought Leaf Factories Moving Up the Quality Ladder in the Nilgiris
As illustrated in Table 1, ten of the BLFs interviewed during fieldwork in the Nilgiris had recently
introduced two or more processing lines, segregating tea leaves of different qualities (fine, medium,
and course leaf) through the production process and providing price-based incentives to smallholders.
Although with some variation, the BLFs that have initiated product-quality differentiation at the
factory level showed a number of similar characteristics and strategies related to process upgrading,
which in turn have supported the BLFs in successful product upgrading and, in some cases, functional
upgrading into packing and marketing of tea products. These BLFs were strategically approached
by the QUP staff because “the BLFs tended to realise above average prices at auction centres and
procured fine leaves from smallholders” as emphasized by officials at the Tea Board of India and
UPASI-KVK. The average annual production capacity and the capacity utilisation levels of these BLFs
were significantly higher than the other sub-group of BLFs, though generally most of the BLFs in the
region operated at well below their production capacity.
For the historical reasons alluded to above, none of the BLFs sorted leaves before processing until
the serious price downturns in national and international tea markets. The QUP provided the stimulus
for important process upgrading at the BLF level by enhancements in the factories’ quality-control
procedures during the processing of green leaves and their quality procedures at the point of primary
purchase through extensive training and technical assistance. These enhancements included inspection
of various steps in the processing of made tea (from the withering of green tea to the packing of made
tea) related to quality improvement and consistency in the quality of made tea and training of the staff
engaged in tea manufacturing and primary purchase. Dual processing lines, where coarser leaves (B
grade) are sorted from fine leaves (A grade) and manufactured and packed separately were installed,
and six of the factories process two quality products (standard quality and premium quality), while
four of the factories process four to six different qualities.











Capacity (average) million kg 0.85 0.55





techniques (frequency) 10 1
Quality management of
green-leaf purchase
Outsourced quality assessment to
smallholders and/or SHG centre
Quality assessment (if carried out) by buying
agent and/or at factory level
Management of
procurement system
50–150 smallholders near the BLF
Selected SHG centres
Rely mostly on buying agents









Marketing: auction vs. private
sale (average in % of total sale) 60/40 90/10
Source: Author’s field survey.
These BLFs manufactured on average around 50 per cent of the green-leaf intake based on
their own tea cultivation, the remainder being procured from smallholders. In all cases, the BLFs
entered the market as an extension of their own tea cultivation activities during the boom period.
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Since then, they had all accumulated a substantial amount of land for tea cultivation. On average,
these BLFs had 75 acres and supplemented their own leaf production with the purchase of leaf
from smallholders. The introduction of quality differentiation by the BLFs was initially based on
the separation of leaves from their own tea cultivation, but this has increasingly been extended to
and imposed on the smallholders who supply leaves to the factories. Traditionally, smallholder tea
production was a necessary input to the BLFs’ production systems, as a means to take advantage
of economies of scale and increase processing capacity utilisation at the factories. Buying agents
functioned as a key link between the BLFs and smallholders and procurements of tea from the
smallholders were based on ad hoc purchases, in other words, when necessary to increase processing
capacity utilisation at the factories. In order to increase economies of scale and ensure consistency in
the intake of different quality grades, the BLFs modified their procurement system.
Part of this strategy rests on conveying quality requirements to smallholders in order to maintain
consistency in the quality of made tea. Staff members of the QUP actively assisted these BLFs
in the formation of quality-control teams engaged in monitoring the quality of green leaf prior to
manufacturing and enforcement of quality-control procedures at the point of primary purchase.
In many cases, the BLFs have either scaled down their purchasing through agents or have stopped
using agents altogether and instead tend to focus on fewer growers (between 75 and 150 smallholders),
purchasing green leaf directly from the growers through their own buying outlets in villages situated
near and around the factories or at the factory gate (see Table 1). The BLFs impose uniform grading
procedures at the primary purchase stage in order to assure consistency in the intake of different
quality grades as a means to upgrade and differentiate made tea traded at auctions and/or directly to
blending companies. The grading system provided quality-inducing price incentives to smallholders
to deliver better quality leaf: The BLFs offered 2–3 Rs per kg more for medium-standard tea leaves
than for coarser teas in order to obtain a sufficient supply of fine quality, though a few factories offered
a substantially higher price premium on fine leaf. In addition, a few of these factories had started
purchasing substantial volumes of green leaf from some of the functioning centres run by women’s
SHGs. For instance, two SHG centres were initially “linked” to one of the factories and, as a result
of an increase in the quantity and quality of green leaves supplied by the two centres, the factory
increased the number of SHG centres in the area, from which it purchases green leaf, to eight. Not
all BLFs however, have increased their reliance on purchasing from the SHG centres, though they
were approached by UPASI-KVK staff and it was formally agreed to link one or several centres to the
respective factories. As expressed by one of the BLFs, “they [self-help group centres] were not able to
provide anything quantity-wise—like 150–200 kg a day—at the same time we were required to give
them a higher rate, so we cancelled the commitment with the centres”.
Most (but not all) of these BLFs indicated the economic viability of process upgrading: the
restructuring of their procurement system has increased the quality and quantity of green leaf supplied
by smallholders, while the cost of monitoring and sorting different qualities at the factory level has
considerably reduced. Hence, smallholder tea production has become a necessary input to the product
differentiation strategies and product upgrading of these BLFs. Elements of product upgrading is
illustrated in Table 2. The consistency in the quality of made tea enables these BLFs to obtain higher
unit prices at the auction centre with an average price differential (at the auction centre) between gold
tea (very fine-quality, grade A) and standard tea (grade B) of 30 Rs per kg ($0.66).
In this group of BLFs, there is a general tendency to move away from spot market transactions
(partly mediated by buying agents) to direct sourcing strategies (and hence value chain coordination)
of green leaf from smallholders and/or the newly established SHG centres in order to ensure a
sufficient supply of high(er) quality teas. This tendency is also pronounced in the BLFs’ marketing
strategies, which reflects blending companies’ emphasis on direct sourcing strategies to obtain sufficient
volumes of higher quality teas for branded tea products, and the capability of these BLFs to fulfil these
requirements. The BLFs increasingly bypass the auction system and secure direct sales arrangements
with blenders, packers or wholesalers for domestic consumption or export. (Until 2001, marketing of
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made tea was regulated through the Tea Marketing Control order, which stipulated that 75 per cent of
made tea should be sold through the auction system—though this compulsory sale excluded packed
tea and bulk tea exports from tea estates [30]. As a result of consistently declining prices at the three
auction centres in South India, the Tea Board of India permitted the sale of made tea through any
marketing channel from 2001 in order to stimulate price recovery). Direct sales arrangements are more
remunerable (i.e., higher margins), though it was not possible to reveal the magnitude of margins
measured in higher unit value.








Product consistency Improved considerably More or less the same
Average unit price at auction (Rs/kg) 65 47.23
Price split between fine/standard tea at auction (Rs) 30 None
Functional upgrading
Value-added activities (frequency) 5 1
Source: Author’s field survey.
The factories in this group have remained focused primarily on the upgrading of their
existing/conventional businesses (i.e., tea cultivation and manufacturing), but five of the BLFs have
recently entered the packaged tea market segment in South India (Table 2). The ability to maintain
consistency in the made tea, addressing local and regional preferences in taste combined with the
availability of relatively low-cost packing technology have been important factors in the decisions of
these BLFs to undertake functional upgrading. In addition, the domestic market for packaged tea in
India is rapidly growing and the BLFs sell tea products at the factory’s retail outlet (as “single origin
tea”) and to retailers and specialised tea shops (mainly for tourism) in the region.
5.2. Bought Leaf Factories Retaining Traditional Manufacturing and Sourcing Practices in the Nilgiris
The findings summarised in Tables 1 and 2 (below) suggest that there is an emerging bifurcation
between BLFs that has convey quality requirements to smallholders as part of their upgrading
strategies and BLFs that continue to focus intensively on volume rather than quality. The latter
group has relatively low fixed investments and average production capacity and operates at much
lower production costs (see also [34]). The strategies of these BLFs were not aimed at producing higher
quality made tea. Their manufacturing infrastructure was geared to producing fairly large volumes of
standard/substandard made tea and many of the BLFs remain unconvinced that their factories would
be economically sustainable if they had to make significant investment in new processing technologies
and/or improving existing ones. Although some of these BLFs had also recently made process
upgrading-related investments, these investments were mainly aimed at improving the efficiency
of the throughput during the processing of made tea. Typical improvements at the factory level
were in the form of new/improved dryers, in order to increase the throughput/volume per hour
(e.g., from 25 kg/hour to 75 kg/hour) and it is generally agreed that these improvements came at
a relatively low cost. While this group of BLFs indicated that they had engaged in some form of
process upgrading—in particular, improved manufacturing practices—process upgrading in terms of
enhanced quality management at primary purchase and product upgrading (producing higher quality
made tea) were rare if not absent.
In order to secure sufficient supplies of leaves for operating their factories to full (or sufficient)
capacity, it was quite common for these BLFs to rely on buying agents who operated over extremely
wide geographical areas. Apart from one BLF, this group of BLFs (and their buying agents) did not
impose quality control or grading procedures during primary purchasing in the villages and/or sort
coarser and finer leaves before processing. The main focus in transactions between smallholders and
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this group of BLFs remains volume rather than quality, while buying agents working on commission
secure a sufficient supply of green leaves by sourcing from 300 to 500 smallholders widely dispersed
in the region. As indicated in Table 1, the intensive focus on obtaining economies of scale in
low-margin markets is passed on to smallholders in the form of lower buying prices for green leaves,
undermining both the credibility of quality control amongst smallholders and the broader reputation
of the regional crop.
The geographical diversity in the intrinsic quality of leaves resulting from variable soil, climate and
altitude, combined with the lack or limited sorting of leaves before processing makes it tremendously
difficult for the BLFs to ensure consistency in the made tea. However, while inconsistency in the
product sold by these BLFs might exclude them from certain market segments, low-quality made tea
tends to be penalized at the level of price rather than through complete exclusion from the market.
Hence, the BLFs maintain access to domestic and export markets regardless of the substandard quality
and lack of consistency in the made tea. The sale of made tea takes place primarily through the auction
system in the region, the main reason being prompt payment but also, as one of the BLFs interviewed
puts it: “Private buyers know we are short [of cash] and that we want to have the money immediately,
so they squeeze the prices down”.
Branded tea manufacturers and more quality-conscious blending companies (domestic or
international) increasingly bypass tea from this segment of the chain at auctions, preferring instead
auctioned estate tea or tea originating from the well-known quality-conscious BLFs. A substantial part
of the made tea emanating from this segment and traded through auction centres is used either as
“filler” in blends or as a substitute for, for example, Kenyan tea to reduce the overall cost of blended
tea, or is sold on domestic or export markets as low-value CTC tea. Apparently, emerging markets in
for instance the Middle East present new opportunities through which the disposal of substandard
tea products can take place. Several Indian-owned companies that were traditionally only engaged in
blending and exporting North India high-quality tea (e.g., Darjeeling tea) to markets in Europe have
recently invested in blending and warehouse facilities in South India. The decision to start purchasing
and exporting auctioned Nilgiris teas was partly based on the availability of “very cheap and fairly
good tea suited for export to one dollar markets” (e.g., Pakistan or Iraq)—as expressed by one of the
managers interviewed.
6. Limitations to State-Led Upgrading of the Smallholder–BLF Sector?
The Tea Board of India and UPASI-KVK have provided the arenas for product and process
upgrading in the smallholder–BLF strand of the value chain, against a backdrop of severe price
discounts attached to Nilgiris tea and exclusionary dynamics waves in higher-margin markets
resulting from the proliferation of product certifications, private proprietary-defined quality and
process standards and other types of private governance in retailer- and brand manufacturer-driven
strands of the GVC over the last decades. Apart from the enforcement of a statutory minimum quality
standard and a uniform grading system differentiated according to the composition of tea leaves, the
“upgrading program” provided financial incentive structures and training to BLFs and facilitated
linkages between smallholders and BLFs. However, as elucidated above, only around one third of the
BLFs have “adopted” the proposed model of upgrading processing techniques and quality control
procedures through direct sourcing at the smallholder level as a means to comply with more stringent
basic quality criteria and differentiate high quality tea products. Apparently, upgrading trajectories by
these BLFs are related to possession of land and processing capacity.
According to the Tea Board of India and the BLFs interviewed, numerous stakeholder meetings
organised by the Tea Board of India and UPASI-KVK have been held, where all operating BLFs in the
region have in principle agreed to comply with the differentiated grading procedures and to enforce
the minimum 65 per cent count of fine leaf at the primary purchasing level. In addition, a consensus
on the rejection of substandard quality tea has been formalised: the factories have agreed that if a
particular consignment of leaves from a smallholder or buying agent is rejected at one factory due to
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substandard quality, the neighbouring BLFs are obliged to follow suit, thereby forcing the smallholders
to improve the quality of tea.
In practice, the picture is much less clear as illustrated above: many BLFs operate at well below
their production capacity and follow a strategy of buying leaves from smallholders, regardless of
quality, rather than insisting on a minimum quality standard and sorting leaves according to the
three grading standards. While repercussions in cases of non-compliance with the minimum quality
standards were put in place during the late 2000s, a majority of the BLFs continue to focus on
quantity rather quality and at least two observations point towards the limits of state-led upgrading
interventions targeting all BLFs in the region: Firstly, according to both officials at the Tea Board of
India and the BLFs interviewed, poor-quality made tea can pass the requirements stipulated by the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (PFA)—even with only 50 per cent of fine leaves. As an official
from the Tea Board of India emphasized: “BLFs are aware that, even with far lesser fine leaf than what
has been stipulated by the Tea Board, one can make tea which would definitely pass the PFA standard
and that the Tea Board would not be in a position to act against them in such cases”.
Secondly, as already noted, poor-quality tea may still normally find a market, though in the South
Indian case, it has been increasingly harder penalized in terms of price, and the BLFs in the region
maintain access to domestic and export markets. This process is fuelled by an increased demand for
CTC tea products in emerging markets (notably in the Middle East) and rapidly growing domestic tea
consumption—both of which present new opportunities for sale of low-quality CTC teas.
More research is needed to understand the nature and scope of the bifurcation of BLFs as well
as its geographical manifestation. However, it remains that the majority of BLFs that have upgraded
their processes and products supplement their own tea cultivation with smallholder tea production.
These BLFs have strong incentives to engage in vertical coordination and enforcement of effective
quality-control procedures in order to reduce the cost of monitoring quality at the factory gate and,
at the same time, enjoy greater economies of scale and an optimisation of the benefits of premiums
attached to higher quality tea. A majority of these BLFs are concentrated in or near Coonoor Taluk and
Kotagiri Taluk, which form the main part of the Nilgiris, characterised by very good infrastructural
conditions linking the surrounding villages, while the BLFs that are solely based on purchasing leaves
from smallholders are dispersed in more remote areas in the Nilgiris. This seems to suggest emerging
regional divergences, where smallholder (and village) access to high(er) value market segments
presupposes the “luck” of being intentionally selected by BLFs on the basis of geographical proximity.
Thus far, relatively few smallholder communities outside of Coonoor and Kotagiri are involved in any
kind of smallholder upgrading initiatives. These smallholders have been the major losers in the face of
the changing priorities of branded international and national tea manufacturers in local auctions, who
have increasingly bypassed the generally lower quality teas they produce.
7. Conclusions
Policy prescriptions on value chain interventions for development, and strategies for moving up
the “ladder” in GVCs have proliferated in recent years and are often part of the efforts to improve or
strengthen the weakest link in the domestic parts of the value chains and/or to link “smallholders to
market programmes” and promote linkages between smallholders and remunerative export markets.
Formation of farmers’ organisations and direct linkages to the agro-food industry are typically one of
the key instruments ([40] (p. 72), [41]). This paper has explored recent state-initiated interventions
to upgrade and improve the competitive position of the South Indian smallholder–BLF strand of the
GVC for tea. A comprehensive “quality revitalization” scheme financed by the Tea Board of India took
the form of enforcing grading standards at the first point of green leaf sale, which was simultaneously
intended to resolve crop reputation issues in international markets. In addition, the Tea Board of India
provided financial incentive structures, technical assistance and training on a “non-exclusive basis”
to BLFs. Apart from “awareness meetings” at the village level focusing on appropriate husbandry
practices, the initiated model was based on the premises that product and process upgrading by BLFs
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and direct linkages to smallholders would facilitate more stringent quality requirements transmitted
to smallholders.
The research presented in this paper suggests that by directing attention to vertical coordination,
competences in quality-control tasks, and catering for compliance with more stringent basic quality
criteria, some BLFs have been successful in process, product—and to some extent—functional
upgrading. The rewards of quality differentiation are transmitted to smallholders in the form of
higher prices attached to higher quality tea leaves. However, the research also suggests that there
is an emerging divergence between BLFs operating in line with the tightly linked smallholder–BLF
model and those BLFs retaining traditional sourcing practices based on a loosely coordinated supply
chain and producing poorer quality teas. The latter group of BLFs did not impose price incentives
attached to fine-quality leaves, or grading of leaves at primary purchase, on the grounds that the
introduction of grading by any single buyer would simply divert trade to competitors. The loss
of volume would severely compromise the profitability of these BLFs, which is based on obtaining
economies of scale in low-margin markets. Higher quality standards and vertical coordination seem
to result in increasing bifurcation where some smallholder growers are integrated into high-margin
markets through prominent BLFs and a mass of “others” outside this tightly coordinated strand of
the value chain, supplying low-priced, poor-quality tea mainly traded at the auctions in South India.
A different set of upgrading policy strategies that mitigate bifurcation (or in other words exclusion)
and uneven economic development would need to take into account the nature of competition and
low production capacity utilisation in South India and increasing demand for low-value CTC tea in
domestic and export markets. One possible avenue would be to impose higher quality standards and
to improve the capacity of the Tea Board of India to enforce and control the quality (and penalize in
the case of non-compliance) of the more than 300 registered buying agents and the 118 operating BLFs
on a regular basis. However, increasing the capacity of the state to regulate effectively would come
at a high price to the public purse and this might call for both private and public sector involvement
in the establishment of a strong collective organisation that could create and support initiatives and
provide a basis for self-regulation by all BLFs and direct and support the upgrading of smallholder
production and offer an inclusive upgrading pathway for the smallholder–BLF strand in the region.
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